This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary...

[eng] This article studies the conflicting objectives of an environmental protection agency and a competition-policy authority in an asymmetric duopoly. We examine cases where the competition-policy authority may oppose an environmental tax in order to prevent a firm from acquiring a dominant...

[fre] Maia David Les approches volontaires comme instrument de régulation environnementale Depuis une dizaine d'années, les grandes entreprises polluantes ont été de plus en plus nombreuses à adopter une attitude active face à la protection de l'environnement. Ces initiatives des...

This paper examines the effect of emission taxes on pollution abatement and social welfare, when abatement goods and services are provided by a Cournot oligopoly with free-entry. We point out initially that a higher tax not only increases demand for abatement; it also makes polluters less...

The aim of this paper is to compare different environmental policies for cost-effective habitat conservation on agricultural lands, when the desired spatial pattern of reserves is a random mosaic. We use a spatially explicit mathematical programming model which studies the farmers' behavior as...

This paper considers the welfare and policy implications of a merger between environment firms (i.e., firms managing environmental resources or supplying pollution abatement goods and services). The traditional analysis of mergers in Cournot oligopolies is extended in two ways. First, we show...