We consider the standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition with ex ante identical firms but depart from the literature in assuming that R&D is characterized by mildly, instead of strongly, decreasing returns to scale. We establish that only extreme R&D levels are possible at...

The apparent technological leadership of a firm at a given moment in time often hides the fact that a market dominant position is not necessarily secured forever. To what extent can challengers or potential entrants catch up with technological leaders ? Examples illustrating the decline of some...

We study optimal patent design, contrasting the case that two or more innovations are needed to operate a new technology with the traditional case that a single innovation is directly commercialisable. The major finding is that with complementary innovations the patentability requirements should...

We consider a modification of the standard two-stage model wherein two high-cost firms conduct cost-reducing R&D, in a setting with spillovers, and then Cournot compete against a low-cost firm that engages in no R&D. Two R&D cooperation scenarios are presented: the R&D cartel and the joint lab....