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Purpose – This research seeks to investigate the role of key corporate governance mechanisms in determining a firm's post‐bankruptcy performance following reorganisation. Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on agency theory and uses a unique sample of 111 filing companies...
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We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. In particular, we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if, having observed the agent's...
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A one-period, simultaneous-offers bargaining game is analyzed in which, for each player, there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not reach the other player. The unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon,...
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This paper studies a general model of holdup in a setting encompassing the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is shown that if renegotiation is modeled as an infinite-horizon noncooperative bargaining game, then, with a simple initial contract, an efficient...
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