This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events...

type="main" <p>The authors' study provides suggestive evidence of the negative effects of politically connected CEOs on the corporate performance and governance of publicly listed companies in China. Newly listed Chinese companies with politically connected CEOs are more likely to have boards that...</p>

Pyramidal organizational structures are common throughout the world. This article considers an explanation for pyramids built by the state: separating firms from political interference. Although intermediate pyramidal layers insulate managers from a pyramid's top owners and hence induce agency...

We examine how language barriers affect the capital market reaction to information disclosures. Using transcripts from non-U.S. firms' English-language conference calls, we find that the calls of firms in countries with greater language barriers are more likely to contain non-plain English and...

We study the frequency of restatements by foreign firms listed on US exchanges. We find that the restatement rate of US listed foreign firms is significantly lower than that of comparable US firms and that the difference depends on the firm's home country characteristics. Foreign firms from...