We extend the hiring and firing framework of Shepp and Shiryaev (J Econ Dyn Control 20:1523–1539, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1996</CitationRef>) to include infighting, and solve the profit-maximization problem using our numerical technique. With infighting, we find a smaller optimal firm size, and lowered firm value that stems from...</citationref>

The authors study two-player, pie-splitting games in which one player knows the pie and the other knows only its probability distribution. The authors compare treatments in which incentive-efficient strikes (disagreements) are possible with alternatives in which efficiency forbids strikes. They...

This article reports on an experiment that is designed to test predictions about the frequency of disagreement (strikes) in games with complete information. An empirical test of the "joint-cost" theory, which relates strike activity to the marginal cost of striking, is based on a set of...

We investigate the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in "intergenerational games" or games in which a sequence of nonoverlapping "generations" of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for...