To isolate the impact of the assumption of model-consistent expectations, this paper proposes a baseline case in which households are individually rational, have full information and learn using forecast rules specified as in the minimum state variable representation of the economy. Applying...

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level ℓ_i about the state of nature coincide, we obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our...

I develop an equilibrium model with collateral constraints in which rational agents are uncertain and learn about the equilibrium mapping between fundamentals and collateral prices. Bayesian updating of beliefs by agents can endogenously generate booms and busts in collateral prices and largely...

Incorporating adaptive learning into macroeconomics requires assumptions about how agents incorporate their forecasts into their decision-making. We develop a theory of bounded rationality that we call finite-horizon learning. This approach generalizes the two existing benchmarks in the...