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The Social Contract with Endogenous Sentiments

Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007

and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es …-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals differ in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution … in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547222

Redistributive Taxation with Endogenous Sentiments

Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan Mª; Kranich, Laurence - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual attitudes toward others are endogenously determined …. Attitudes toward others influence the desired extent of redistribution. There are multiple politico-economic equilibria. In one … majority vote for high redistribution. In the other equilibrium, highly skilled workers work above the mean and are admired by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547329

Marry Your Like: Assortative Mating and Income Inequality

Greenwood, Jeremy; Guner, Nezih; Kocharkov, Georgi; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating. Additionally, assortative mating affects household income inequality. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851409

Inequality and Public Resource Allocation

Esteban, Joan; Ray, Debraj - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We set up a signaling game where individuals differ in ability and wealth. Higher ability means larger benefit supported by the government. Costly signals are used to transmit information regarding own deservingness. However, capital market imperfections may perturb the signals by limiting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547130

Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization

Esteban, Joan; Ray, Debraj - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium) level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear function of the Gini coefficient, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547270