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We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We …. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547404
, the worker-optimal matching. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851385
Recent research in macroeconomics emphasizes the role of wage rigidity in ac- counting for the volatility of unemployment fluctuations. We use worker-level data from the CPS to measure the sensitivity of wages of newly hired workers to changes in aggregate labor market conditions. The wage of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010550421
This paper points out an empirical puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851487
decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities - one where … generates greater investment eficiency, romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency, since more high ability … educational investments and labor force participation based on matching regimes. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851358
(partially) group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115552
We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337
We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401