Similar Search Results

Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance

Olivella, Pau; Vera-Hernández, Marcos - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine private health insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider a purely private system or a system in which private insurance supplements a public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately funded health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547456

Building an Honest Microfinance Organization: Embezzlement and the Optimality of Rigid Repayment Schedules and Joint Liability

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find … that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid … insurance can be provided by borrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851343

Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate

Hamers, Herbert; Klijn, Flip; Slikker, Marco - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

Scheduling jobs of decentralized decision makers that are in competition will usually lead to cost inefficiencies. This cost inefficiency is studied using the Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium cost and the cost attained at the centralized optimum. First,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851455

Procurement Design with Corruption

Burguet, Roberto - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

and the contractor sign the contract, the latter may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. Thus, the mechanism … the sponsor solves, and characterize the optimal contract. I discuss both the case of fixed bribes and bribes that depend … contract curtails quality not only for low e¢ ciency contractors but also for the most efficient contractors. Implementation is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011095071

Bounded Rationality and Correlated Equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players can deviate from rational behavior. Instead we assume that there exists a lower bound p 2 [0; 1] such that all players play and are believed to play rationally with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188510

Uncertain Rationality and Robustness in Games with Incomplete Information

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

Economic predictions are highly sensitive to model and informational specifications. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that, in static games with incomplete information, only very weak predictions, namely, the interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) actions, are robust to higher-order belief...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196334

Approximate Knowledge of Rationality and Correlated Equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851330

The Distribution of Talent across Contests

Azmat, Ghazala; Möller, Marc - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? Do contestants avoid competition? In this paper we show that the distribution of abilities plays a crucial role in determining contest choice. Positive sorting exist only when the proportion of high ability contestants is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851331

Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching

He, Yinghua; Miralles, Antonio; Yan, Jianye - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences of both sides need not be strict. Using the idea of a competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851345

Government Information Transparency

Albornoz, Facundo; Esteban, Joan; Vanin, Paolo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851347