This note makes two comments on recent NNS models. First, it disputes the way physical capital has been introduced into these models, arguing that this leads to the dubious postulate that the cost of adjusting physical capital stock is an order of magnitude lower than the cost of changing...

We study the dynamic general equilibrium of an economy where risk averse shareholders delegate the management of the firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non-tradable equity position and a variable 'salary'...

The objective of this Paper is to propose a number of alternative decentralized interpretations of representative agent style stochastic growth economies and to explore their implications for the generality of this model construct. Under our first interpretation, firms exist forever and...

We discuss the extent to which the expectation of a rare event, not present in the usual post-war sample data, but not rationally excludable from the set of possibilities – the peso problem – can affect the behaviour of rational agents and the characteristics of market equilibrium. To that...

This paper studies the pricing of financial assets in a complete general equilibrium set-up. We begin with an asset pricing model à la Lucas grafted on a standard Real Business Cycles model. We provide a new decentralized interpretation of such a model in which firms make meaningful investment...

We are interested in the macroeconomic implications of the separation of ownership and control. An alternative decentralized interpretation of the stochastic growth model is proposed, one where shareholders hire a self-interested manager who is in charge of the firm’s hiring and investment...

The objective of this paper is to provide, in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model, an answer to the following five questions: 1) To what extent does an economy subject to regular variations in labour productivity growth differ from one where labour productivity is constant? 2)...

We reexamine the issue of executive compensation within a general equilibrium production context. Intertemporal optimality places strong restrictions on the form of a representative manager's compensation contract, restrictions that appear to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many...