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Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … the degree of competition between suppliers, as well as other more practical indirect ways to stimulate innovation. We … discuss the effects of standard setting activities by large, often public, procurers on innovation races. We evaluate how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875

A Brief Survey of the Economics of Open Source Software

Fershtman, Chaim; Gandal, Neil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

The open source model is a form of software development in which the source code is made available, free of charge, to all interested parties; further users have the right to modify and extend the program. Open source software (OSS) methods rely on developers who reveal the source code under an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009148876

Microstructure of Collaboration: The 'Social Network' of Open Source Software

Fershtman, Chaim; Gandal, Neil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

The open source model is a form of software development with source code that is typically made available to all interested parties. At the core of this process is a decentralized production process: open source software development is done by a network of unpaid software developers. Using data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662205

Entry Mistakes

Cabral, Luís M B - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

Frequently, aspiring entrants have only limited information about their potential rivals’ entry decisions. As a result, the outcome of the entry game may be that more firms enter than the market can sustain; or, at least, that unnecessary entry investments are made. We refer to these outcomes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662244

Does Microsoft Stifle Innovation? Dominant Firms, Imitation and R&D Incentives

Cabral, Luís M B; Polak, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

firm's incentives for R&D. These changes influence the probability of innovation through two effects: changes in total R … shift from the rival firm to the dominant firm is a good thing as it decreases the likelihood of duplicate innovation (we … rights are strong. That is, firm dominance is good for innovation when (but only when) property rights are strong. We also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789049

Internet Security, Vulnerability Disclosure and Software Provision

Choi, Jay-Pil; Fershtman, Chaim; Gandal, Neil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In this paper, we examine how software vulnerabilities affect firms that license software and consumers that purchase software. In particular, we model three decisions of the firm: (i) an upfront investment in the quality of the software to reduce potential vulnerabilities; (ii) a policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792060

R&D Alliances as Non-cooperative Supergames

Cabral, Luís M B - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

R&D alliances (Research Joint Ventures or other institutional forms) normally involve repeated, non-contractible actions (investments in R&D), and uncertainty regarding both success and the termination date. Accordingly, we model these agreements as equilibria of infinite-period supergames. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136561

Patents, Imitation and Licensing in an Asymmetric Dynamic R&D Race

Fershtman, Chaim; Markovich, Sarit - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

arrangement on the speed of innovation, firm value and consumers' surplus. The paper demonstrates the circumstances under which a … surplus than a regime that awards patent for the final innovation. This result holds even in cases where the length of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114234