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Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Svensson, Roger - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that an invention of higher quality is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865973

The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and Oligopolists

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Exit of venture-backed firms often takes place through sales to large incumbent firms. We show that in such an environment, venture-backed firms have a stronger incentive to develop basic innovations into commercialized innovations than incumbent firms, due to strategic product market effects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791605

Acquisitions, Entry, and Innovation in Network Industries

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim Ingemar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

option of selling to an incumbent increases innovation incentives for entrepreneurs when network effects are strong and … necessarily restrict innovation incentives. We also show that network effects promote acquisitions over entry and that the … entrepreneur has strong incentives to invest in the initial user base of the innovation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083667

Venture Capital, Patenting, and Usefulness of Innovations

Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We analyze incentives to develop entrepreneurial ideas for venture capitalists (VCs) and incumbent firms. If VCs are sufficiently better at judging an idea's value and if it is sufficiently more costly to patent low than high value ideas, VCs acquire valuable ideas, develop them beyond the level...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643508

And the Winner Is--Acquired: Entrepreneurship as a Contest with Acquisition as the Prize

Henkel, Joachim; Rønde, Thomas; Wagner, Marcus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

paper, we analyze a two-stage innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants. In the first stage … innovation. In the second stage, successful entrants bid to be acquired by the incumbent. We assume that entrants cannot survive …&D approaches than the incumbent and are more likely to generate the highest value innovation. Thus, the need of entrants to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784763

Entrepreneurial innovations and taxation

Haufler, Andreas; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

entrepreneurs’ choice of riskiness (quality) of an innovation project, and on their mode of commercializing the innovation (market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083431

Entrepreneurial Innovations, Entrepreneurship Policy and Globalization

Douhan, Robin; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

What explains the world-wide trend of pro-entrepreneurial policies? We study entrepreneurial policy in a lobbying model taking into account the conflict of interest between entrepreneurs and incumbents. It is shown that international market integration leads to more pro-entrepreneurial policies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530366

Trade Secret Laws, Labour Mobility and Innovations

Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504700

Market and Technical Risk in R&D

Gerlach, Heiko A.; Rønde, Thomas; Stahl, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We endogenize the market risk (at given technical risk) in firms’ R&D decisions by introducing stochastic R&D in the Hotelling model. It is shown that if the technical risk is sufficiently high, the market risk remains low even if firms pursue similar projects. This leads firms to focus on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504272

Labour Pooling in R&D Intensive Industries

Gerlach, Heiko A.; Rønde, Thomas; Stahl, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

more likely in situations where the innovation step is large and the probability for a firm to be the only innovator is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067450