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Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes and Globalization

Bordo, Michael D; Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

In this Paper we focus on the different historical regime experiences of the core and the periphery. Using conventional … default in large part because of their extensive external debt obligations denominated in core country currencies. This left … century forbearers. To obtain access to foreign capital they may need a hard peg to the core country currencies, or else can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123652

A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

Erdil, Aytek; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, "Reference Rules," to make core-selecting package auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008459772

How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents

Ichino, Andrea; Muehlheusser, Gerd - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper shows that over monitoring a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine loyalty and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. This intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we lose the opportunity to learn how the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504367

Punishment Without Crime? Prison as a Worker-Discipline Device

Miller, Marcus; Smith, Jennifer C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

An ‘efficiency wage’ model developed for Western economies is reinterpreted for Soviet Russia assuming that it was the Gulag not unemployment that acted as a ‘worker-discipline device’. Archival data now available allows for a basic account of the dynamics of the Gulag to be estimated....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504586

Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration

Shin, Hyun Song - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

Should arbitrators adjudicate on the basis of their own investigations, or invite the interested parties to make their cases and decide on the basis of the information so gathered? I call the former the inquisitorial procedure in arbitration and the latter the adversarial procedure. I conduct a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504638

Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts

Bisin, Alberto; Guaitoli, Danilo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard (hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium is determined by the interaction of financial intermediaries. The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is that intermediaries are restricted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497778

Foreclosure with Incomplete Information

White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We investigate the robustness of the new foreclosure doctrine and its associated welfare implications to the introduction of incomplete information. In particular, we let the upstream firm’s marginal cost be private information, unknown to the downstream firms. The previous literature has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498007

More Insiders, More Insider Trading: Evidence from Private Equity Buyouts

Acharya, Viral V; Johnson, Tim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Recent takeover activity has been characterized by broader participation in acquiror financing on both debt and equity sides. We focus on private equity buyouts, and investigate whether the number of financing participants is related to the likelihood of insider trading prior to the bid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498160

Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets—What Are the Welfare Effects?

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083449

Centralized decision making against informed lobbying

Costa Lima, Rafael; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We re-address the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized decision making of local policies when policymakers are subject to capture by special interest groups. In particular, we consider the case where lobbies have private information about their ability to exert influence. We find a new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083471

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