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Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?

Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority … shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate governance. Moreover, the presence of powerful families who control many … governance, what matters most is not the legal power granted to minority shareholders but rather the absence of conflicts of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240

Globalization and the 'New Enterprise'

Marin, Dalia; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Globalization has been identified by many experts as a new way firms organize their activities. This Paper surveys recent work that examines the role of trade integration between similar and dissimilar countries for these changes in corporate organization. It is shown that international...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662173

The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms

Rajan, Raghuram G; Zingales, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Major technological, regulatory, and institutional changes have made finance more widely available in recent years, amounting to a bona fide ‘financial revolution’. In this article, we focus on the impact the financial revolution has had on the way firms are (or should be) organized and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789143

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

viewed as detrimental to shareholders. We also find that there is commonly a big difference between a state's ability to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection

Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder protection affects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder … and small shareholders. Moreover, strengthening legal minority shareholder protection may have adverse effects on the … shareholders, e.g., equal treatment rules, can be detrimental. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662105

Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme

Marcincin, Anton; van Wijnbergen, Sweder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

Voucher privatization programmes have been criticized for leading to excessively dispersed ownership and hence failure of control and insufficient corporate governance. We analyse the results of the five auction rounds of the Czech privatization programme and subsequent stock market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123768

Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland

Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

shareholders’ protection in transitional economies. Shareholder’s opportunities to extract private benefits of control turn out to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379

Corporate Governance Externalities

Acharya, Viral V; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We argue that the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects and is affected by the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance give higher payoffs to their management to incentivize them. This forces firms with good governance to also pay their management more than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136630