This paper analyzes optimal re-election bars when incumbents gain socially valuable experience in office. We develop a two-period model in which the output of a public good depends on an office-holder's effort, ability and experience. When campaigning for election to an open seat in the first...

The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we show that the power of elections as a selection and incentive device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents. A higher vote...

Although they would yield social benefits, some political projects may not be implemented in democracies. Prominent examples are the reform of European labour markets, the reduction of government debt or the reduction of greenhouse gases. We suggest introducing political contracts to make...

In this paper we introduce vote-share contracts. Such contracts contain a vote-share threshold that incumbents must reach in order to be reelected. In a simple model, we illustrate the working of vote-share contracts. Such vote-share contracts curb socially detrimental incumbency advantages by...

Politicians tend to push the amount of public debt beyond socially desirable levels in order to increase their reelection chances. We develop a model that provides a new explanation for this behavior: office holders undertake debt-financed public projects, but postpone the timing of part of the...

This paper examines the impact of public infrastructure on industrial location when increasing returns are present. Poor infrastructure implies costs of Samuelson's `iceberg' form and alter trade both within and between countries. Trade integration implies that firms tend to locate in countries...

This paper provides factual evidence on the extent of public intervention in the Italian economy. It further illustrates the internal contradictions and weaknesses of public action in Italy. New policy proposals to solve old structural problems of the Bel Paese are then discussed. Among them, a...

We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other...

If productivity increases more slowly for services than for manufactured goods, then services suffer from Baumol’s cost disease and tend to become relatively more costly over time. Since the welfare state in all countries is an important supplier of tax financed services, this translates into...

The direct impact of local public goods on welfare is relatively easy to measure from land rents. However, the indirect effects on home and job location, on land use, and on agglomeration benefits are hard to pin down. We develop a spatial general equilibrium model for the valuation of these...