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How to Win a Decision in a Confederation

Jehiel, Philippe; Thisse, Jacques-François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent jurisdictions. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority of one of the jurisdictions through a bidding procedure among the group members. We identify the following trade-off:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661614

Optimal Choice of Characteristics for a Non-Excludable Good

Brocas, Isabelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

I consider a model where a principal decides whether to produce one unit of an indivisible good (e.g. a private school) and which characteristics it will contain (emphasis on language or science). Agents (parents) are differentiated along two substitutable dimensions: a vertical parameter that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498112

Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

externalities. We show that the hold-up problem, which occurs if non-verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661662

Properties of Scoring Auctions

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497976

License Auctions and Market Structure

Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

auction format affects the incentives for explicit or tacit collusion among incumbents. A crucial role is played by the … suggest a positive role for some auction formats in which the number of licences is endogenously determined at the auction. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661756

Multi-object Auctions: On the Use of Combinational Bids

Branco, Fernando - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

optimal auction and its implementation. I show that an optimal mechanism requires combinational bids for the bundle and for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498027

Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: experimental evidence

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Castro, Manuel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment of second-price sealed bid auctions of a common value good with two bidders. Bidders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165658

Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: an Experimental Investigation

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Otamendi, F. Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially … bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for … the good and exit the auction once they have obtained one good. We show that, contrary to equilibrium predictions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145460

The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: laboratory evidence in a common value auction

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Castro, Manuel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We study in the laboratory a series of first price sealed bid auctions of a common value good. Bidders face three types of information: private information, public information and common uncertainty. Auctions are characterized by the relative size of these three information components. According...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468529

Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring

Bigoni, Maria; Potters, Jan; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106