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Specific Knowledge and Performance Measurement

Raith, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper examines optimal incentives and performance measurement in a setting where an agent has specific knowledge … choice of performance measures and incentives depends on the agent’s knowledge, environmental risk, technological uncertainty …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504471

Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory

Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

, the model offers an explanation for motivational crowding out: Control systems and pecuniary incentives may erode morale …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662241

Resource Allocation and Firm Scope

Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666612

Joint Production in Teams

Battaglini, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765

The Ownership of Ratings

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Peyrache, Eloïc; Quesada, Lucía - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Standard & Poor's provides corporate governance ratings to firms who can, upon learning those, decide to reveal them or not to the market. This paper identifies the circumstances under which such a simple ownership contract over ratings can emerge as the optimal arrangement. Firms hiding their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067394

Externalities and the Allocation of Decision Rights in the Theory of the Firm

Bester, Helmut - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the … decision right to the agent to implement ‘small’ projects. Extensions of the model discuss the role of effort incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661581

Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms

Matouschek, Niko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

I develop a property rights theory of the firm in which managers bargain over the sharing of quasi-rents in the presence of private information. I analyse the interdependence between the ownership structure of firms and the bargaining inefficiency that is due to the presence of private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662109

Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We explore the role of firms in insuring risk-averse workers. As a device that allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the spot market if workers are sufficiently risk averse and the firm can base incentive payments on good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667043

Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles

Meyer, Margaret A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992

- the reduction in second-period incentives is outweighed by the increase in first-period incentives. Thus, even though …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667058

Relational Delegation

Alonso, Ricardo; Matouschek, Niko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an infinitely repeated game a long-lived principal faces a series of short-lived agents. Every period they play a cheap talk game a la Crawford and Sobel (1982) with constant bias,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789058