, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we … discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction … – a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details …

is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its inefficiency - it usually generates higher expected revenue. We … also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc. …

buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can … auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue. A substantially revised …

This paper studies multiple object auctions when there are two kinds of bidders: those interested in the bundle being …-price auctions allows the implementation of the optimal mechanism, while a combination of first-price auctions does not. …

address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive … critical papers in the subject. The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions … the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections …

economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially …

vertical product differentiation and entry. Both firms face fixed set-up costs and quality-dependent costs of production, and … compete on quality and price. With identical quality-dependent costs, the incumbent will always deter entry if possible, i ….e. if fixed costs are high. Quality will be set at a level lower than the optimal quality set if entry was accommodated. If …

that Aghion and Bolton's analysis is incomplete in some respects, as they do not model the entry of new suppliers. We … construct a model where entry is costly, so that entering suppliers have to earn a quasi-rent in order to recoup the entry cost …. Reducing an entrant's profits by the help of a breach penalty then reduces the probability of entry in the first place, thus …

may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable 'grim trigger strategies …' available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential … entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre-entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms …