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Do Retail Incentives Work in Privatizations?

Keloharju, Matti; Knüpfer, Samuli; Torstila, Sami - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

-term increase in volume. Incentives have been surprisingly effective in meeting stated privatization objectives. A dollar spent on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656346

The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation

Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

The privatization process in Eastern Europe is not irreversible. Future governments may want to expropriate successful …. The threat of expropriation adversely affects investment and restructuring efforts. It is shown that a mass privatization … privatization revenues for the government than a policy that relies exclusively on selling shares to the highest bidder. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667078

Reforming Europe's Labour Market: Political Issues

Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

In this paper we study the political issues associated with reform in the European labour market. We first discuss the role played by labour market rigidities in European society, and argue that reform is a difficult task because many regulations and rigidities benefit the majority of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497719

On the Political Economy of Labour Market Flexibility

Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993

This paper starts from the observation that despite their very high levels of unemployment, major European countries have devoted few resources to reducing it. This suggests that there is little political concern about high unemployment. I develop a model where the government tries to increase...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498035

Lobbying competition over trade policy

Gawande, Kishore; Krishna, Pravin; Olarreaga, Marcelo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991547

Political Foundations of the Resource Curse

Robinson, James A; Torvik, Ragnar; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In this Paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067503

A Framework for Analysing the Political Support for Active Labour Market Policy

Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

We develop a general equilibrium analysis of the impact of active labour market policy on unemployment, wages and the welfare of the employed. This framework is used to assess the political support in favour of such policies and to relate it to the working of such policies and other parameters...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662144

A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Allocation: An Empirical Assessment

Cadot, Olivier; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stephan, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666545

Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination

Battaglini, Marco; Bénabou, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We study political activism by several agents (lobbyists, unions, etc.) who have private but imperfect policy-relevant signals, and seek to influence the decisions of a policy maker. When agents can share information and coordinate their actions, the equilibrium is shown to be equivalent to that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792452

Democratic Public Good Provision

Hassler, John; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper analyses an overlapping generation model of public good provision under repeated voting. The public good is financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across different skill groups and across generations. We contrast...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123612