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Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation
Frisell, Lars; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792547
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Allocative and Productive Efficiency in REE with Asymmetric Information
Messner, Simon; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
We characterize the divergence between in informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect o incentive efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791369
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On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control
Heidhues, Paul; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067524
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Informational Externalities, Herding and Incentives
Bru, Lluís; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
A version of the herding prediction model with a rational expectations flavor is reexamined in the light of incentive theory. The welfare loss at the market solution with respect to the incentive efficient solution can be decomposed into an information externality term minus an incentive cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661971
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The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control
Neven, Damien J; Röller, Lars-Hendrik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies that assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792501
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Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control
Neven, Damien J; Röller, Lars-Hendrik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency - while making lobbying less effective - also implies real resource costs. We examine the performance of two alternative standards that can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124327
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On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists. Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods?
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
that the equilibrium behaviour of experts and consumers in credence goods markets sensitively depends on the details of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791194
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Experts vs Discounters: Competition and Market Unravelling When Consumers Do Not Know What they Need
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
This paper studies price competition between experts and discounters in a market for credence goods. While experts can … giving any advice. The unobservability of diagnosis effort induces experts to use their tariffs as signaling devices. This … makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which experts survive competition by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792449
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Price Discrimination in Markets for Experts' Services
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
This Paper studies the consequences of price discrimination in a market for experts’ services. In the case of experts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504480
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Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty
Jovanovic, Boyan; Prat, Julien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784751