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Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit the buyer’s acceptance than in the case where entry can occur only by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504295

Entrepreneurial Innovations, Competition and Competition Policy

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We construct a model where an entrepreneur could either innovate for entry or for sale. It is shown that increased product competition tends to increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale relative to entry. Increased competition reduces entrants' and acquirers' profits in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497863

Industry Concentration and Welfare - On the Use of Stock Market Evidence from Horizontal Mergers

Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

There is diverging empirical evidence on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers: consumer prices (and thus presumably competitors' profits) often rise while competitors' share prices fall. Our model of endogenous mergers provides a possible reconciliation. It is demonstrated that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497962

Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498010

A Simple Theory of Predation

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973970

Buying to Sell: Private Equity Buyouts and Industrial Restructuring

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim Ingemar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

. Evaluating optimal antitrust policy, we point out that an active private equity market can aid antitrust authorities by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083585

Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083745

Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy

Mermelstein, Ben; Nocke, Volker; Satterthwaite, Mark; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

computationally, allows firms to invest or propose mergers according to the relative profitability of these strategies. An antitrust … authority is able to block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy when the antitrust authority can commit to a … antitrust authority. We find that optimal policy can differ substantially from what would be best considering only welfare in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084004

Anatomy of Cartel Contracts

Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084010

Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions

Brito, Duarte; Ribeiro, Ricardo; Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial acquisitions involving pure financial interests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084091