We develop a model of banking competition which allows us to disentangle the roles that limited liability, deposit insurance (both with flat and risk-based premia), and rivalry for deposits play in determining risk-taking incentives both in the asset and the liability side of the balance sheet....

Today’s regulatory rules, especially the easily-manipulated measures of regulatory capital, have led to costly bank failures. We design a robust regulatory system such that (i) bank losses are credibly borne by the private sector (ii) systemically important institutions cannot collapse...

We propose a new form of hybrid capital for banks, Equity Recourse Notes (ERNs), which ameliorate booms and busts by creating counter-cyclical incentives for banks to raise capital, and so encourage bank lending in bad times. They avoid the flaws of existing contingent convertible bonds...

We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, which experienced a shadow-banking "run" and played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007-09. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets worth $1.3 trillion while insuring the newly...

We analyze securities trading by banks and the associated spillovers to the supply of credit. Empirical analysis has been elusive due to the lack of securities register for banks. We use a unique, proprietary dataset that has the investments of banks at the security level for 2005-2012 in...

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks...

This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any...

We argue that the extent to which supervision of banks takes place on the supranational level should be guided by two factors: cross-border externalities from bank failures and heterogeneity in bank failure costs. Based on a simple model we show that supranational supervision is more likely to...

A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regulator will not provide capital, and banks, which may take excess risk if they believe the regulator will provide capital. When the regulator's cost of injecting capital is private information, it...

Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank’s failure may undermine confidence in the banking...