Why do firms delegate job design decisions to workers, and what are the implications of such delegation? We develop a … private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by … delegation: when market observability of job content is high, the compensation needed to get low ability workers to self-sort is …

We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an … world. We characterize the optimal delegation schemes for all discount rates and show that they resemble organizational … arrangements that are commonly observed, including centralization and threshold delegation. For small biases threshold delegation …

We analyse the optimal delegation of decision rights by a uninformed principal to an informed but biased agent. When … his preferred one. We fully characterize the optimal delegation set for general distributions of the state space and … delegation sets to be optimal. Finally, we show that the optimal delegation set takes the form of a single interval if the agent …

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …

It has been argued that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, which acts as an agent for the … that delegation enables a wider class of economies to sustain zero inflation than would be able to do so in its absence. We …

the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal. …