Savings accounts are owned by most households, but little is known about the performance of households’ investments. We create a unique dataset by matching information on individual savings accounts from the DNB Household Survey with market data on account-specific interest rates and...

Chetty and Szeidl (2012) propose to estimate the effect of housing on portfolio choice by distinguishing between the effect of mortgage debt and the effect of home equity and by endogenizing these two variables. When replicating their study with French data, we obtain similar qualitative...

I model the purchase behavior of main and secondary housing by Spanish households using the panel sample from the first two waves of the Spanish household finance survey (EFF). I estimate discrete hazard models using retrospective and within-period purchase sequences. I also estimate an (S,s)...

The empirical evidence on rational inattention lags far behind the theoretical developments: micro evidence on the most immediate consequence of observation costs - the infrequent observation of state variables - is not available in standard datasets. We contribute to filling the gap with two...

Models of shrouding predict that firms lack incentives to compete on add-on prices. Working with a large Turkish bank to test SMS direct marketing promotions to 108,000 existing checking account holders, we find that messages promoting a large discount on the overdraft interest rate reduce...

We examine a randomized trial that allows separate identification of peer screening and enforcement of credit contracts. A South African microlender offered half its clients a bonus for referring a friend who repaid a loan. For the remaining clients, the bonus was conditional on loan approval....

Using a unique panel data set from a UK credit card company, we analyze the interest rate sensitivity of subprime credit card borrowers. In addition to all individual transactions and loan terms, we also have access to details of a randomized interest rate experiment conducted by the lender on...

We show that after the revelation of corporate fraud in a state, the equity holdings of households in that state decrease significantly both in the extensive and the intensive margins. Using an exogenous shock to fraud detection and exogenous variation in households’ lifetime experiences of...

We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the Italian lending market. We show that banks’ optimal price response to an increase in adverse selection varies with competition. Exploiting matched data on loans and defaults, we estimate models of demand for...

We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market and to advances in information...