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Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791797

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124002

Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

Fehr, Ernst; Kremhelmer, Susanne; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504775

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical Papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656392

Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaption? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism

Fehr, Ernst; Henrich, Joseph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in …In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans … that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling and indirect reciprocity do not provide …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661452

Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned with fairness. Conversely, contracts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792499

Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123667

Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790

Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

find a large and positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to … exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that democratic participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With … endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

Rotten Kids with Bad Intentions

Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468559