Showing 1 - 10 of 309
This Paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where banks can invest in a prudent or a gambling asset. We show that if intermediation margins are small, the banks’ franchise values will be small, and in the absence of regulation only a gambling equilibrium will exist....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067507
This Paper shows that bank closure policies suffer from a ‘too-many-to-fail’ problem: when the number of bank failures … is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank …-ante standpoint. We formalize this time-inconsistency of bank regulation. We also argue that by allowing banks to purchase failed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136753
Many of the world’s developed economies have introduced, or are planning to introduce, bank bail-in regimes. Both the … planned EU resolution regime and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty involve the participation of bank creditors in … bearing the costs of bank recapitalization via the bail-in process as one of the (main) mechanisms for restoring a failing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083962
We analyze public interventions to alleviate debt overhang among private firms when the government has limited information and limited resources. We compare the efficiency of buying equity, purchasing existing assets, and providing debt guarantees. With symmetric information, all the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577813
theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207
Central bank policy suffers from time-inconsistency when facing a banking crisis: A bailout is optimal ex post but ex … reputation for the central bank are high, monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns, and when the cost of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788955
This Paper argues that the backbone of the pre-1914 international financial architecture was the concern about moral hazard. No decentralized system can leave without safeguards against free riding and this typically means that problem countries must find by themselves the means to fix their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791208
This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn, and a lender of last … resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject to a …. Moreover, when the LLR does not charge penalty rates, the bank chooses the same level of risk and a smaller liquidity buffer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791539
We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor’s incentives leads to excessive ‘rollover failure’ by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791694
Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765