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Epstein, Gil S; Gang, Ira - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251

Does Terrorism Work?

Gould, Eric D; Klor, Esteban F - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper examines whether terrorism is an effective tool to achieve political goals. By exploiting variation in … response to terror. Hence, terrorism appears to be an effective strategy in terms of shifting the entire Israeli political … landscape to the left. These findings may shed light on the causes underlying the spread of global terrorism in the last few …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458294

Distributional Conflict in Organisations

Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M; Wärneryd, Karl - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations. Contrary to what has frequently been argued, we show that multi-divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single-tier organizations, even though they offer more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504716

Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa

König, Michael; Rohner, Dominic; Thoenig, Mathias; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We postulate a Tullock contest success function...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145465

Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players’ decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792217

Brothers in Alms? Coordination between NGOs on Markets for Development Donations

Aldashev, Gani; Marini, Marco; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper studies the stability of coordination between mission-driven non-governmental organizations (NGOs) competing for donations. We build a non-cooperative game-theoretic model of alliance formation between NGOs that compete through fundraising activities and impose externalities on each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784769

On the Political Economy of Labour Market Flexibility

Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993

This paper starts from the observation that despite their very high levels of unemployment, major European countries have devoted few resources to reducing it. This suggests that there is little political concern about high unemployment. I develop a model where the government tries to increase...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498035

Succession Rules and Leadership Rents

Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498064

The Lifeboat Problem

Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats"). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes ("lifeboats"). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition ("a lifeboat"). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082545

Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages

Konrad, Kai A. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This Paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656133