Most cities enjoy some autonomy over how they tax their residents, and that autonomy is typically exercised by multiple municipal governments within a given city. In this chapter, we document patterns of city-level taxation across countries, and we review the literature on a number of salient...

We study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments. Where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base, one can observe two types of externalities: a horizontal externality, working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low...

We study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare, focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations. In a representative-agent model of fiscal federalism, fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax-setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare. If,...

This paper provides a coherent, logical framework that connects the main issues concerning fiscal policy in an economic and monetary union. The focus is on normative issues within the European Union.

Interjurisdictional competition over mobile tax bases is an easily understood mechanism, but actual tax-base elasticities are difficult to estimate. Political pressure for reducing tax rates could therefore be based on erroneous estimates of the mobility of tax bases. We show that tax...

This paper uses a new economic geography model to analyze tax competition between two countries trying to attract internationally mobile capital. Each government may levy a source tax on capital and a lump sum tax on fixed labor. If industry is concentrated in one of the countries, the analysis...

This Paper analyses the tax competition and tax exporting effect of financial integration. On the one hand, financial integration increases capital mobility and thus the incentive for countries to compete for capital. On the other hand, financial integration increases foreign ownership of firms...

The explosion of globalization has increased firms incentives to exploit international tax differentials to their benefit. In this paper we consider a simple world with two countries with different market sizes and two multinationals with a division in each country. Both countries use a...

This paper studies the effect of switching from the destination to the origin principle of taxation on non-cooperative commodity tax equilibrium. When taxes are constrained to uniformity across commodities, the switch has no effect. When differentiated taxes are allowed, the effects of the...