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Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084279

Debt-sensitive Majority Rules

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans; Grimm, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the parliamentary majority required to approve it. In a two-period model we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468567

Political Institutions and Economic Growth

Marsiliani, Laura; Renström, Thomas I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We analyze the impact of micro-founded political institutions on economic growth in an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over a public good (as well as in age). Labour and capital taxes finance the public good and a public input. The benchmark institution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504348

Media Capture and Wealth Concentration

Corneo, Giacomo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare effects induced by alternative policy options and derive … influence the public opinion. In case of voting over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad, it is shown that an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789042

Clientelism and Aid

Casamatta, Georges; Vellutini, Charles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyse the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124076

Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt

Song, Zheng Michael; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of fiscal policy in a world comprising a set of small open … taxes and low debt accumulation. The paper characterizes the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the voting game in each economy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083405

Centralized decision making against informed lobbying

Costa Lima, Rafael; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We re-address the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized decision making of local policies when policymakers are subject to capture by special interest groups. In particular, we consider the case where lobbies have private information about their ability to exert influence. We find a new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083471

Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics

Grossman, Gene; Helpman, Elhanan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

determinants of national spending on local public goods in a three-stage game of campaign rhetoric, voting, and legislative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136600

Diversity and the Power of the Elites in Democratic Societies: A model and a test.

Bandiera, Oriana; Levy, Gilat - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determined by the preferences of the median -typically poor- agents or whether they reflect the wishes of the wealthy elites. A model shows that when politicians belonging to different groups can form coalitions, the wealthy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008611020

Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare

Hindricks, Jean; Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analysing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selection effects, and thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economies of scale, so...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504327