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A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504294

Is Deposit Insurance A Good Thing, And If So, Who Should Pay for It?

Morrison, Alan; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Deposit insurance schemes are becoming increasingly popular around the world and yet there is little understanding of how they should be designed and what their consequences are. In this Paper we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. We analyse a model in which agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136557

Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

Emons, Winand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We consider successive generations of non-altruistic individuals carrying a good or bad gene. Daughters are more likely to carry their mother's gene than the opposite one. Competitive insurers can perform a genetic test revealing an agent's gene. They may condition their quotes on the agent's or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661858

Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints

Inderst, Roman; Wambach, Achim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Ever since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the equilibrium-non-existence problem has been one of the major puzzles in insurance economics. We extend the original analysis by considering firms that face capacity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661929

Does Propitious Selection Explain Why Riskier People Buy Less Insurance?

De Donder, Philippe; Hindriks, Jean J.G. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

levels and insurance purchases, rather than the positive correlation predicted by the standard insurance theory. Hemenway …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791420

Macroeconomics after the crisis – hedgehog or fox?

Miller, Marcus; Zhang, Lei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Following the financial crisis of 2008/9, there has been renewed interest in what Greenwald and Stiglitz dubbed ‘pecuniary externalities’. Two that affect borrowers and lenders balance sheets in pro-cyclical fashion are described, along with measures that might help curb their destabilising...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083632

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private …-country relationship between available indicators of insurance transaction costs and variation in public and private insurance. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682880

Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers

Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the … riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a departure from the existing literature on agency theory in that moral hazard is … develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504241

Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics

Dewatripont, Mathias; Legros, Patrick; Matthews, Steven A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498043

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769