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Boone, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper argues that the efficiency distribution of players in a game determines how aggressively these players interact. We formalize the idea of balance of power: players fight very inefficient players but play softly versus equally (or more) efficient players. This theory of conduct...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124365

Evidence of Information Spillovers in the Production of Investment Banking Services

Benveniste, Lawrence M; Ljungqvist, Alexander P.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We present evidence that firms attempting IPOs learn from the experience of their contemporaries. These information … the argument that IPOs are implicitly bundled as a means of promoting more equitable sharing of information production … returns in primary equity markets reflect, at least in part, an institutional response to information externalities. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791488

A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification

Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

This paper develops a theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria that are all regular. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497794

Rational parasites

Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Galbiati, Roberto; Henry, Emeric - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Understanding the impact of legal protection on investment is of major importance. This paper provides a framework for addressing this issue, and shows that investment may actually be higher in the absence of legal protection. Focusing on the application to innovation, in an environment where an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083356

Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring

Bigoni, Maria; Potters, Jan; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

information and vary how long players have to wait before changing output. We find that (i) the facilitating role of flexibility …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106

An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy

Cabral, Luís M B - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I derive optimal equilibria and consider a series of comparative statistics and extensions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666417

Prisoners' Other Dilemma

Blonski, Matthias; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

in these models. We propose a way to take these pay-offs into account, and find that cooperation as equilibrium of the … cooperation is supportable in equilibrium. Our results apply to other games sharing the strategic structure of the Prisoner …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666887

Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for Labour Relations

Falk, Armin; Gächter, Simon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. Many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789197

Strikes as the 'Tip of the Iceberg' in a Theory of Firm-Union Cooperation

Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Jaaidane, Touria - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We model cooperation between an employer and a workers' union as an equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game with … discounting and imperfect monitoring. The employer has private information about firm profitability. The model explains the … employees. Strikes appear as random equilibrium phenomena, during finite-duration, but recurrent phases of play, triggered by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791411

Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

party that reports sufficient information with the fines paid by all other parties, and with finitely high fines achieve the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136696

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