This paper considers an equilibrium model of unemployment in a labour market where all vacancies are advertised in a newspaper. Unemployment occurs in occupations that are short on vacancies. New vacancies are created by entrepreneurial search and investment, so it may take some time before an...

By offering or choosing a contract the informed agent might reveal information to the principal which could be used for immediate renegotiation. This is discussed in an axiomatic approach. We show that if, given the revealed information, there exists a contract which is preferred by everyone,...

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish...

This Paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. The nature of the inefficiency depends, however, on the balance between the two key...

We explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices. If being an 'insider' is better than being an 'outsider', firms may merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival. The stock-value is increased, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. We also...

We model a new effect of exclusivity on non-contractible investments in buyer/seller relationships. By restricting the buyer to purchase from only one seller, exclusivity increases the buyer’s costs of haggling during renegotiation and hence the seller’s relative bargaining power and...

We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain termination fees for, both, the target and the acquirer, subject to parties’ bargaining power and outside options. In equilibrium, termination fees are offered by firms with outside options in exchange for a greater share of merger...

This paper proposes a model of boundedly rational choice that explains the well known attraction and compromise effects. Choices in our model are interpreted as a cooperative solution to a bargaining problem among an individual’s conflicting dual selves. We axiomatically characterize a unique...

I estimate a search-and-bargaining model of a decentralized market to quantify the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations, asset prices and welfare, and to quantify the effects of intermediaries that facilitate trade. Using business-aircraft data, I find that, relative to the...