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Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: experimental evidence

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Castro, Manuel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment of second-price sealed bid auctions of a common value good with two bidders. Bidders face three different types of information: common uncertainty (unknown information), private information (known by one bidder) and public information (known by both bidders),...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165658

Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: an Experimental Investigation

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Otamendi, F. Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for … the good and exit the auction once they have obtained one good. We show that, contrary to equilibrium predictions … exit the auction, leaving those who play closer to theoretical predictions to bid for the third good. Support for this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145460

The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: laboratory evidence in a common value auction

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Castro, Manuel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We study in the laboratory a series of first price sealed bid auctions of a common value good. Bidders face three types of information: private information, public information and common uncertainty. Auctions are characterized by the relative size of these three information components. According...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468529

Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the majority is divided as a result of information imperfections. The minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. The majority thus faces two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083533

Recreating the South Sea Bubble: Lessons from an Experiment in Financial History

Giusti, Giovanni; Noussair, Charles; Voth, Hans-Joachim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Major bubble episodes are rare events. In this paper, we examine what factors might cause some asset price bubbles to become very large. We recreate, in a laboratory setting, some of the specific institutional features investors in the South Sea Company faced in 1720. Several factors have been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083988

Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders

Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R; Turban, Sébastien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084134

Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory

Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an assumption in those...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196037

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586

Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes

Casella, Alessandra; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Palfrey, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

and the market generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough. We test the …-unit double auction. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534095

Bornhorst, Fabian; Ichino, Andrea; Kirchkamp, Oliver; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We run an experiment in which students of different European nationalities are matched in groups of five and repeatedly choose with whom within their group they want to play a trust game. Participants observe of each other age, gender, nationality and number of siblings. The region of origin,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468504