Showing 1 - 10 of 195
We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368
We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a short run increase in collusion. However, in a limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586
voters and we test these predictions using a novel experimental design. In line with predictions, we find that information on … the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective. While voters with higher cognitive abilities are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083707
This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084601
economic experiment, in which a group of Hispanic and African American families play a standard public goods game. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791784
This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661831
It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504573
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504682
Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136600
This Paper establishes and explores the implications of a somewhat surprising empirical finding. Although civil war adversely affects the performance of social indicators in general, poorer countries lose less, in absolute and relative terms, than richer countries. It is argued that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123856