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Separating Selection and Incentive Effects in Health Insurance

Gardiol, Lucien; Geoffard, Pierre-Yves; Grandchamp, Chantal - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60,000 adult...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124425

Insurance Search and Switching Behavior

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper looks into the search behavior of consumers in the market for health insurance contracts. We consider the recent health insurance reform in The Netherlands, where a private-public mix of insurance provision was replaced by a system based on managed competition. Although all insurers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466330

Selective contracting and foreclosure in health care markets

Bijlsma, Michiel; Boone, Jan; Zwart, Gijsbert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We analyze exclusive contracts between health care providers and insurers in a model where some consumers choose to stay uninsured. In case of a monopoly insurer, exclusion of a provider changes the distribution of consumers who choose not to insure. Although the foreclosed care provider remains...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491723

Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment

Bijlsma, Michiel; Boone, Jan; Zwart, Gijsbert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First, we find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144733

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504294

Is Deposit Insurance A Good Thing, And If So, Who Should Pay for It?

Morrison, Alan; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Deposit insurance schemes are becoming increasingly popular around the world and yet there is little understanding of how they should be designed and what their consequences are. In this Paper we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. We analyse a model in which agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136557

Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion

Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654

To Charge or Not to Charge: Evidence from a Health Products Experiment in Uganda

Fischer, Greg; Karlan, Dean S.; McConnell, Margaret; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

model combining the learning aspect of experience goods with reference-dependent preferences, we setup a field experiment in … Northern Uganda in which three health products differing in their scope for learning were initially offered either for free or … for sale at market prices. In line with prior studies, when the product has potential for positive learning, we do not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083717

Health Insurance without Single Crossing: why healthy people have high coverage

Boone, Jan; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Standard insurance models predict that people with high (health) risks have high insurance coverage. It is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured. We show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209831

Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints

Inderst, Roman; Wambach, Achim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Ever since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the equilibrium-non-existence problem has been one of the major puzzles in insurance economics. We extend the original analysis by considering firms that face capacity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661929