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Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection

Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. In our framework, blockholder and manager are distinct parties and the presence of a blockholder can both protect and hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662105

Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme

Marcincin, Anton; van Wijnbergen, Sweder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

Voucher privatization programmes have been criticized for leading to excessively dispersed ownership and hence failure of control and insufficient corporate governance. We analyse the results of the five auction rounds of the Czech privatization programme and subsequent stock market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123768

Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland

Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper investigates valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be substantially lower than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379

Corporate Governance Externalities

Acharya, Viral V; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

. The effect is stronger the greater the competition for managers and the stronger the managerial bargaining power. While …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136630

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Europe's 'New' Stock Markets

Bottazzi, Laura; Da Rin, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The creation of Europe’s ‘new’ stock markets represents a major experiment in market design with important implications for the ability to support innovative, fast-growing companies. We evaluate the success of these markets based on a large number of measures of firm performance and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123860

Debt or Equity? The Role of Venture Capital in Financing the New Economy in Germany

Audretsch, David B; Lehmann, Erik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Using a dataset of the firms listed on the Neuer Markt in Germany, this Paper demonstrates that venture backed firms differ from firms with other financial resources, especially debt. Thus, the results of this study provide evidence for the hypothesis that small and innovative firms are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504258

Does the New Economy Need New Governance? Ownership, Knowledge and Performance

Audretsch, David B; Lehmann, Erik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We study the implications of ownership and its induced incentives on firm performance in the ‘New Economy’. Instead of traditional performance we use firm survival on the stock market as the performance indicator. Using a unique data set of all 341 firms listed on the Neuer Markt, the German...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504269