Similar Search Results

Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War

Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in … states of the game, the 'tipping states', which are determined by the contestants’ relative strengths, their distances to … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661937

Multi-Battle Contests

Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique equilibrium analytically and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791548

Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability

Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124335

Who is the Enemy?

Epstein, Gil S; Gang, Ira - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251

When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia

Chacón, Mario; Robinson, James A; Torvik, Ragnar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our model using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656168

On the Political Economy of Labour Market Flexibility

Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993

This paper starts from the observation that despite their very high levels of unemployment, major European countries have devoted few resources to reducing it. This suggests that there is little political concern about high unemployment. I develop a model where the government tries to increase...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498035

Succession Rules and Leadership Rents

Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498064

The Lifeboat Problem

Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats"). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes ("lifeboats"). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition ("a lifeboat"). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082545

Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages

Konrad, Kai A. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This Paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656133

Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action … in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656134