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Procurement Favouritism and Technology Adoption

Branco, Fernando - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

The design of cost minimizing procurement rules for the selection of contractors among distinct technological groups …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504568

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497976

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976795

Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096108

Reputation and Entry in Procurement

Butler, Jeff; Carbone, Enrica; Conzo, Pierluigi; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

procurement, may hinder entry by new firms in public procurement markets. In this paper we report results from a laboratory … experiment exploring the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. We implement a repeated procurement game with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083951

Privatization and Quality: Evidence from Elderly Care in Sweden

Bergman, Mats; Johansson, Per; Lundberg, Sofia; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084097

Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening

Calzolari, Giacomo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082534

Procurement when Price and Quality Matter

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost + marginal cost of providing quality). We solve for the optimal buying procedure, i.e. the procedure that maximizes the buyer's expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661783

Procuring Innovation

Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

, including ideas and research, from their strategic suppliers. A careful design of procurement policy is crucial to make … potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … consider a menu of procurement methods and policies for best procuring new knowledge and innovative products, discussing their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875

Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions

Cantillon, Estelle; Pesendorfer, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper considers the problem of identification and estimation in the first-price multi-unit auction. It is motivated by the auctions of bus routes held in London where bidders submit bids on combinations of routes as well as on individual routes. We show that submitting a combination bid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791983