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Blonski, Matthias; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

in these models. We propose a way to take these pay-offs into account, and find that cooperation as equilibrium of the … parameter space, all cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). We derive an … others defect, and argue it is a better measure for the ‘likelihood’ of cooperation than the critical level at which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666887

Revisiting Dynamic Duopoly with Consumer Switching Costs

Padilla, Atilano Jorge - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993

The degree of collusiveness of a market with consumer switching costs is studied in an infinite-horizon overlapping-generations model of duopolistic competition. In contrast to previous models of switching costs, this paper assumes that firms compete for the demand for a homogeneous good by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788939

Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring

Bigoni, Maria; Potters, Jan; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106

R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence

Cassiman, Bruno; Veugelers, Reinhilde - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Our results on the relationship between R&D spillovers and cooperation in R&D suggest that it is necessary to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662294

Networks of Relations and Social Capital

Lippert, Steffen; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114333

Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players’ decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792217

Price Wars in Finite Sequential Move Price Competition

Wallner, Klaus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper characterises the unique Markov equilibrium in the sequential move, finite horizon pricing duopoly with discounting. Simple, short cycles repeat until the last two periods. For discount factors above 0.75488, there are three-period reaction function cycles and below 0.75488,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504324

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586

Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde

Anderson, Simon P; Engers, Maxim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The symmetric Nash equilibrium involves excessive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662078

Bertrand Equilibria and Sharing Rules

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We analyse how sharing rules affect Nash equilibria in Bertrand games, where the sharing of profits at ties is a decisive assumption. Necessary conditions for either positive or zero equilibrium profits are derived. Zero profit equilibria are shown to exist under weak conditions if the sharing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791613