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Procurement Favouritism and Technology Adoption

Branco, Fernando - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

The design of cost minimizing procurement rules for the selection of contractors among distinct technological groups requires the favouritism of inefficient firms. It is unclear whether these policies provide incentives for inefficient firms to adopt more efficient technologies. In this paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504568

Procuring Innovation

Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

To stay on top of global competition, firms and governments often need to acquire innovative goods and services, including ideas and research, from their strategic suppliers. A careful design of procurement policy is crucial to make potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875

Auctions vs Negotiations in Public Procurement: Which Works Better?

Lalive, Rafael; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Public agencies rely on two key modes to procure goods and services: auctions and direct negotiations. The relative … passenger railway services in Germany, where regional agencies can use auctions and negotiations to procure regional passenger … auctions. This analysis suggests accounting for the endogeneity of the choice of procurement mode by estimating the mode of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275960

Contract Renewal and Incentives in Public Procurement

Dalen, Dag Morten; Moen, Espen R; Riis, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper explores how the government’s choice of renewal policy in public procurement programmes can be used as a mechanism to provide firms with incentives to supply quality. Several firms produce a public service. The firms participate in a tournament where they are ranked according to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114452

Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969

Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372

On discrimination in procurement auctions

Jehiel, Philippe; Lamy, Laurent - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

of their surplus is internalized by the designer. The optimal reserve policy in standard auctions is also analyzed to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084599

Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096108

Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions

Compte, Olivier; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane; Verdier, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662229

Legal Standards, Enforcement and Corruption

Immordino, Giovanni; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Since enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and the honesty of officials, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in per-capita income and decreasing in officials' corruption. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504469