Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 423
Cover Image
Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative
Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players’ decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792217
Cover Image
Rotten Kids with Bad Intentions
Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468559
Cover Image
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a … cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … the principals make contract offers, they anticipate that social preferences affect agents' behavior. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433
Cover Image
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
A central insight of agency theory is that when a principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789080
Cover Image
Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
Herweg, Fabian; Karle, Heiko; Muller, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
. When writing a long-term contract the parties have to rely on renegotiations in order to ensure materially efficient trade … ex post. The type of the concluded long-term contract affects the buyer's expectations regarding the outcome of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083642
Cover Image
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete contracts. We explore the implications of different degrees of relationship-specificity when there are two parties, A and B, who can make investments in physical capital (instead of human capital). If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083975
Cover Image
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach
Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995), parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non-contractible investments have been made. Most contributions apply the regular Nash bargaining solution. We explore the implications of using the generalized Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084329
Cover Image
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered
Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084400
Cover Image
Protocol Design and (De-)Centralization
Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
(iii) contract before receiving their information. Well informed agents with similar preferences do not contract or … contract does not involve any communication. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498109
Cover Image
On the Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options in Bargaining
de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Most of the economic literature on bargaining has focused on situations where the set of possible outcomes is taken as given. This paper is concerned with situations where decision-makers first need to identify the set of feasible outcomes before they bargain over which of them is selected. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854532