Similar Search Results

Strauss-Kahn, Vanessa; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper analyses decisions regarding the location of headquarters in the US for the period 1996-2001. Using a unique firm-level database of about 30,000 US headquarters, we study the firm- and location-specific characteristics of headquarters that relocated over that period. Headquarters are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791881

From Sectoral to Functional Urban Specialization

Duranton, Gilles; Puga, Diego - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We document and then develop a model explaining and relating changes in firms’ organization and in urban structure. Sharing of business services by headquarters and of sector-specific intermediates by production plants within a city reduces costs, while congestion increases with city size. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661784

Trade in Business Services in General Equilibrium

Markusen, James R.; Strand, Bridget - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Trade in business services has been attracting attention from academic researchers, policy makers, and business journalists. While there are many anecdotes, there has been little in the way of formal theory applied to this issue. In this paper, we adapt a general model of fragmentation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662176

Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791951

Tax Contracts and Government Formation

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

proportional elections. A tax contract specifies a range of tax rates a party is committed to if in government. We develop a new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504289

Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World

Legros, Patrick; Newman, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching partners is not fully transferable has been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous to those that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficient conditions for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504313

Tying, Risk-Sharing, and `Lock-In': An Investigation of Countertrade Contracts

Marin, Dalia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992

The paper sees countertrade - the tying of trade flows - as an insurance contract that mitigates contractual hazards … investment. This way tying is seen as a commitment device against renegotiation during contract execution when investments are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123662

Financial Contracting Theory Meets The Real World: An Empirical Analysis Of Venture Capital Contracts

Kaplan, Steven; Strömberg, Per Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory, by studying actual contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. (1) The distinguishing characteristic of VC financing is that they allow VCs to separately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123862

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier; Sadzik, Tomasz; Sannikov, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the optimal contract in a setting where the CEO can affect firm value … through both productive effort and costly manipulation, and may undo the contract by privately saving. The optimal contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477185

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in … closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives … utility, a pecuniary cost of effort, Gaussian noise or continuous time. The contract's functional form is independent of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509464