Similar Search Results

Is the Regulation of the Transport Sector Always Detrimental to Consumers?

Behrens, Kristian; Gaigné, Carl; Thisse, Jacques-François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

The aim of this paper is to qualify the claim that regulating a competitive transport sector is always detrimental to consumers. We show indeed that, although transport deregulation is beneficial to consumers as long as the location of economic activity is fixed, this is no longer true when, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791947

Market and Public Provision in the Presence of Human Capital Externalities

De Fraja, Gianni - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper suggests that human capital externalities are important in determining whether goods and services should be privately or publicly provided. We study situations where that the cost incurred by an individual provider for providing quality is affected by the human capital of her...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124298

'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships

Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jérôme - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

same firm when a better design of the infrastructure helps also to save on operating costs (positive externality … environments where the quality of the infrastructure may be hard to describe in advance, we isolate conditions under which either …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136716

The Political Economy of Privatization and Competition: Cross-Country Evidence from the Telecommunications Sector

Colin Xu, Lixin; Li, Wei; Zhen-Wei Qiang, Christine - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Using a new data set of the telecommunications sector on privatization (1981-98 for 167 countries) and competition … liberalization in the telecommunications sector. Building on the framework of a generalized private interest theory, we derive … telecommunications sector. We pay particular attention to how the effects of interest groups on policies vary from more democratic to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504478

Network Competition and Entry Deterrence

Calzada, Joan; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We develop a model of logit demand that extends to a multi-firm industry the traditional duopoly framework of network competition with access charges. Firstly, we show that, when incumbents do not face the threat of entry and compete in prices, they inefficiently establish the reciprocal access...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504712

Using and Abusing Economic Theory

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498003

Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications

Bourreau, Marc; Hombert, Johan; Pouyet, Jérôme; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

In telecommunications some operators have deployed their own networks whereas some others have not. The latter firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498041

Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broadband

Nardotto, Mattia; Valletti, Tommaso; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We consider the impact of a regulatory process forcing an incumbent telecom operator to make its local broadband network available to other companies (local loop unbundling, or LLU). Entrants are then able to upgrade their individual lines and offer Internet services directly to customers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083592

The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences

Binmore, Kenneth; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £22½ billion ($34 billion or 2½ % of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661794

How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European ‘third generation’ (3G, or ‘MTS’) mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662052