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Innovation, Competition, and Investment Timing

Koskinen, Yrjö; Mæland, Jøril - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and when to invest in it. Innovators have to provide costly effort and they learn privately the cost of investing. Multiple efforts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084370

Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: an Experimental Investigation

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Otamendi, F. Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145460

On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

buying one unit. The sellers simultaneously set reserve prices and use second price auctions as rationing device. An … demonstrate that not allowing sellers to use second price auctions may enhance total surplus. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662147

On Seller Estimates and Buyer Returns

Gershkov, Alex; Toxvaerd, Flavio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666660

How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?

Cornelli, Francesca; Felli, Leonardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails its sale. This Paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors' proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by retaining the minority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791603

Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms

Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms …. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792072

Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096108

Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction

Wambach, Achim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504666

Information Structures in Optimal Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk; Pesendorfer, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067488

Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We develop a model with many advertisers (products) and many advertising markets (media). Each advertiser sells to a different segment of consumers, and each medium has a different ability to target advertising messages. We characterize the competitive equilibrium in the media markets and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008607505