Similar Search Results

Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666704

Which Institutions Encourage Entrepreneurs to Create Larger Firms?

Estrin, Saul; Korosteleva, Julia; Mickiewicz, Tomasz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

corruption, weaker property rights and especially intellectual property rights, and a larger state on entrepreneurs who plan to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854547

Corruption as a Barrier to Entry: Theory and Evidence

Campos, Nauro F; Estrin, Saul; Proto, Eugenio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

Conventional wisdom depicts corruption as a tax on incumbent firms. This paper challenges this view in two ways. First …, by arguing that corruption matters not so much because of the value of the bribe ("tax"), but because of another less … studied feature of corruption, namely bribe unavoidability. Second, we argue that the social costs of corruption arise not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682881

Challenges and Opportunities for Resource Rich Economies

van der Ploeg, Frederick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The political economy of resource rich countries is surveyed. The empirical evidence suggests that countries with a large share of primary exports in GNP have bad growth records and high inequality, especially if the quality of institutions and the rule of law are bad. The economic argument that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661592

How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down

Hunt, Jennifer - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504493

The Price of Media Capture and the Looting of Newspapers in Interwar France

Bignon, Vincent; Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper develops a new insight enabling the empirical study of media capture: minority shareholders of newspapers and readers face similar risks. Both are adversely affected when corrupt insiders use the newspaper for personal profit and receive invisible revenues. This means that relevant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083663

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is … properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229

Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others?

Hunt, Jennifer - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

reduce corruption. Overall, the judiciary and the police are by far the most corrupt institutions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136576

Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?

Hunt, Jennifer; Laszlo, Sonia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the payoffs to the client's decision. We test this framework using a new data set on bribery of Peruvian public officials by households. The theory predicts that bribery is more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114227

Bribery in Health Care in Peru and Uganda

Hunt, Jennifer - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

In this paper, I examine the role of household income in determining who bribes and how much they bribe in health care in Peru and Uganda. I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in public health care: doubling household consumption increases the bribery...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114349