Similar Search Results

Can we Automate Earnings Forecasts and Beat Analysts?

Ball, Ryan; Ghysels, Eric; Zhou, Huan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Can we design statistical models to predict corporate earnings which either perform as well as, or even better than analysts? If we can, then we might consider automating the process, and notably apply it to small and international firms which typically have either sparse or no analyst coverage....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084355

Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms

Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study the effect of earnings manipulation on incentives within the corporate hierarchy. When top management manipulates earnings, it must prevent information leakage from corporate insiders to the outside world. If an insider (e.g. a division manager) gains evidence about earnings...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504644

Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms

Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504726

Ownership and Control of German Corporations

Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relation of ownership to control in Germany is therefore … is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the … holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits from control changes and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666867

The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and Control

Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin; Rossi, Stefano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

the subsequent 100 years, and comparing the pattern of ownership and control with a sample incorporated around 1960. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123634

Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control

Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

principals who control. The reason is that most agents lower their performance as a response to the signal of distrust created by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124063

Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?

Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin; Renneboog, Luc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the US, where there is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124256

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468606

A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders

Acharya, Viral V; Lambrecht, Bart - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083832

Does Relationship Lending Require Opaque (and Conservative) Financial Reporting?

Bigus, Jochen; Hakenes, Hendrik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

For many private firms, relationship lending is the only viable form of outside financing. Relationship lending typically relies on intertemporal loan pricing: losses from early years are recovered by information rents in later years, which stem from the lender's private information regarding...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083940