We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...

We analyze corporate fraud in a model in which managers have superior information but are biased against liquidation, because of their private benefits from empire building. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To curb...

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps to deter illegal...

The financial crisis drew attention to the crucial role of transparency and the independence of financial certification intermediaries, in particular, statutory auditors. Now any anticompetitive practice involving coordinated increases in prices or concomitant changes in quality that impacts...

This Paper analyses the growth and employment effects of the 1994-99 Community Support Framework (CSF) for the Objective 1 Spanish regions, using a simple supply-side model estimated with a panel of regional data. The results suggest that the impact of the Structural Funds in Spain has been...

Following the rationale for regional redistribution programmes described in the official documents of the European Union, this Paper studies a very simple multi-country model built around two regions: a core and a periphery. Technological spillovers link firms’ productivity in each of the two...

Taking both the enlargement process, as currently defined by the EU, and the structural funds as a given, this Paper examines what is the best way for candidate countries to fuel real convergence. The experience from earlier EU enlargements and current economic conditions within the CEEC10...