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Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion

Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654

Optimal Price-Setting in Pay for Performance Schemes in Health Care

Rud Kristensen, Søren; Siciliani, Luigi; Sutton, Matt - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

The increased availability of process measures implies that quality of care is in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable quality is well-described in the incentive-design literature. We seek to narrow the large gap between actual price-setting behaviour in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084045

Paying for Performance with Altruistic or Motivated Providers

Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser (a principal) and a provider (an agent). We assume that: a) providers differ in efficiency and there are two types of provider; b) efficiency is private information (adverse selection); c) providers are partially altruistic or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661600

Upcoding and Optimal Auditing in Health Care (or The economics of DRG creep)

Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

higher price under 'no commitment'. Nevertheless, quality and manipulation remain at lower levels, whereas auditing is more … commit to a given audit policy (commitment); b) the purchaser cannot commit to a given audit policy (no commitment). If … audit is higher under the 'commitment' scenario than under the 'no commitment' one; also, under 'commitment', the degree of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661727

Multitasking, Quality and Pay for Performance

Kaarboe, Oddvar Martin; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791404

Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We explore the role of firms in insuring risk-averse workers. As a device that allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the spot market if workers are sufficiently risk averse and the firm can base incentive payments on good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667043

Sale of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song?

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Mesnard, Alice - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We study how smugglers respond to different types of migration policies - legalisation through the sale of migration visas, or more traditional repressive policies through borders' enforcement, employers' sanctions or deportation - by changing the price they propose to illegal migrants. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083587

Competition, Regulation and Managerial Incentives

De Fraja, Gianni; Iossa, Elisabetta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

This paper examines the effects of a competitive fringe on a regulated firm. Using Hart's (1983) model, we show that competition weakens the managerial incentives for cost reduction: when there is correlation between the cost levels of the firms in the industry, costs are higher in the regulated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067523

Entry, Pricing and Incentives: The Role of Regulatory Commitment

De Fraja, Gianni - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

reduction depends on the extent of the regulator's commitment: if it is possible to commit to the chosen policy, then the market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067561

Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem

Levine, Paul L; Rickman, Neil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We consider a dynamic model of price regulation with asymmetric information where strategic delegation is available to the regulator. Firms can sink non- contractible, cost-reducing investment but regulators cannot commit to future price levels. We fully characterize the Perfect Bayesian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124103