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Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups

Cassiman, Bruno; Ueda, Masako - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Entrants are typically found to be more innovative than incumbent firms. Furthermore, these innovative ideas often originate with established firms in the industry. Therefore, the established firm and the start-up firm seem to select different types of projects. We claim that this is the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662308

The Effect of Segregation and Spatial Mismatch on Unemployment: Evidence from France

Gobillon, Laurent; Selod, Harris - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

In this paper, we investigate how residential segregation and bad physical access to jobs contribute to urban unemployment in the Paris region. We first survey the general mechanisms according to which residential segregation and spatial mismatch can have adverse labour-market outcomes. We then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656303

Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties

Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen; Oreffice, Sonia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterizing an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123732

Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

procedures used in practice, namely a quasilinear scoring auction and negotiation. Specifically, we characterize an upper bound … to what a quasilinear scoring auction and negotiation can achieve, and compare the performance of these procedures … numerically. Quasilinear scoring auctions are able to extract a good proportion of the surplus from being strategic. Negotiation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123964

Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening

Calzolari, Giacomo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082534