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In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This Paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656133
We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251
In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067446
’s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497910
We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best-of-three all-pay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661485
We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661501
We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyse both one …-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie-breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not … have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie. Consequently, in symmetric multi-stage two-player contests, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661524
We study the classical Tullock's model of one-stage contests where the probability of winning is a function of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792334
Hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations. Contrary to what has frequently been argued, we show that multi-divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single-tier organizations, even though they offer more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504716
We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We postulate a Tullock contest success function...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145465